nikki moore

Archive for November, 2008|Monthly archive page

the little virgin of no.thing

In Subjection on November 25, 2008 at 8:32 pm

man at zero point.  woman as lack.  

nietzsche said we would rather will nothing than not will at all… 

but are we thus fascinated, is this simply a hole-y enterprise?  something of nihilism, and then, of course, no.thing of nihilism at all?

we’ve quit the human.  a hollow concept, it offers little more than a container for ambitions, progress and, of course, the holocaust.

we quit woman before we began her.  as lack, lacuna, she never began to begin.

but perhaps the real drive was man all along.  is this self-castration?  the drive to find nothing, no.thing, so that any appearing can be read as pure joy?

what am i trying to say?  why do we represent the masses as hollow mass?  why is the proletariat (Marx) or generic humanity (badiou) all that is available to convey the movement of historical being?  are they simply the virgin Many?

maurice blanchot writes:  “This search for point zero is necessarily ambiguous: it lends itself to all misrepresentations and encourages all simplifications… It is also easy – and perhaps useful – to denounce the illusory character of this search for point zero.  Not illusory, however, but imaginary, almost according to the meaning given this word by mathematics: imaginary is the reference to a man without myth, as is imaginary the reference to the man dispossessed of himself, free of all determination, deprived of all “value,” and alienated to the point where he is nothing but the acting consciousness of this nothing, the essential man of point zero, whose theoretical model certain analyses of Marx have proposed and in relation to whom the modern proletariat discovers itself, defines and affirms itself, even if it does not truly satisfy such a schema.”  p. 80

so perhaps this is something new and perhaps this is something very very old:  womb envy?  virginity… and the empty vessel?  perhaps we haven’t escaped that metaphor, just as we haven’t escaped others.  and unlike irigaray’s theory of the forgotten mother, this mother has not been forgotten. she simply hasn’t been properly named.  the masses, the workers, those who carry the event.  

the blessed virgin.  the penultimate no.thing.

are we still looking to her tearing statues for hope?

is this negativity?

In Love, Subjection on November 21, 2008 at 1:06 am

infinitely demanding, the ticklish subject and now hegel’s phenomenology of mind, at least the introduction.

just quoting today from the latter (itallics mine throughout):

“The force of mind is only as great as its expression; its depth only as deep as its power to expand and lose itself when spending and giving out its substance” – p.9

“The living substance, further, is that being which is truly subject, or, what is the same thing, is truly realised and actual (wirklich) solely in the process of positing itself, or in mediating with its own self in transitions from one state or position to the opposite.  As subject it is pure and smple negativity, and just on that account a process of splitting up what is simple and undifferentiated, a process of duplicating and setting factors in opposition, which [process] in turn is the negation of this indifferent diversity and of the opposition of factors it entails.  True reality is merely this process of reinstating self-identity, of reflecting into its own self in and from its other, and is not an original and primal unity as such, not an immediate unity as such.  It is the process of its own becoming, the circle which presupposes its end or its purpose, and has its end for its beginning; it becomes concrete and actual only by being carried out, and by the end it involves.

The life of God and divine intelligence then, can be spoken of as love disporting with itself…” p.15

“What has been said may also be expressed by saying that reason is purposive activity.  Extolling so-called nature at the expense of thought misunderstood, and more especially the rejection of external purposiveness have brought the idea of purpose in general into ill repute.  All the same, in the sense in which Aristotle, too, characterizes nature as purposive activity, purpose is the immediate, the undisturbed, the unmoved which is self-moving; as such it is subject.  Its power of moving taken abstractly, is the same as the beginning solely because the beginning is purpose.  Stated otherwise, what is actual and concrete is the same as its inner principle or notino simply because the immediate qua purpose contains within it the self or pure actuality.  The realized purpose, or concrete actuality, is movement and process of development.  But this very unrest is the self; and it is one and the same with that immediacy and simplicity characteristic of the beginning just for the reason that it is the result, and has returned upon itself – while this latter again is just the self, and the self is self-referring and self-relating identity and simplicity.” p. 18

light as a…

In Subjection on November 10, 2008 at 9:03 pm

feather.  stiff as a board.

it’s a game you play in junior high, maybe earlier.  willing yourself to be lighter than air and hard as a rock.  

i could never make it work.

so today i’m reading zizek’s ticklish subject.  trying to read, trying to find to read…

and Margaret Atwood’s ‘The Penelopiad’.


First, on ‘The Deadlock of Transcendental Imagination, or, Martin Heidegger as a Reader of Kant’:

in a fascinating discussion of heidegger reading kant, zizek points to (creates?) a mis-step in heidegger’s reading of kant’s theory of the imagination.  to do so, zizek first proposes that Heidegger’s project is, contrary to popular belief, political.  It is a decisionism, Dasein’s decisionism given throwness and all the rest.  All the rest for Heidegger of course being an engagement with the nazi’s that zizek considers a wrong step in the right direction: i.e. rather than revamping the project of Being and Time to pull out the subjectivist transcendental centers that still remained (ex: starting with dasein to get to the existential analytic) (which are said to be the flaws that lead to his nazi affiliations) heidegger should have instead, stuck to those subjectivist approaches.  “nazism,” zizek writes, “was not a political expression of the ‘nihilist, demoniac potential of modern subjectivity’, but, rather its exact opposite: a desperate attempt to avoid this potential” (p.21).

(purportedly zizek means this for heidegger… because clearly…) but moving on…

along these lines, (those above) heidegger’s unfinished project of Being and Time is unfinished for the same reasons that heidegger saddled up with the nazi’s.  it is a problem of imagination.  really.  “what heidegger actually encountered in his pursuit of Being and Time was the abyss of radical subjectivity announced in Kantian transcendental imagination, and he recoiled from this abyss into his thought of the historicity of Being” (p.23).

the problem lies in designation.  with imagination being the site of spontenaity in Kant the question is: phenomenal or noumenal?  “on the one hand, [kant] conceives of transcendental freedom (‘spontenaity’) as noumenal: as phenomenal entities, we are caught in a the web of causal connections, while our freedom (the fact that, as moral subjects, we are free, self-originating agents) indicates the noumenal dimension.”  yet kant’s own reasoning shows that given access to the noumenal we would in fact be puppets, bound to the law and utterly dictated by it.  So whither transcendental freedom?

zizek points out that heidegger reads kant faithfully through this problematic and levels a fair critique at his regression to traditional metaphysics.  yet when kant (unknowingly?) splits the noumenal into two parts (that which cannot be known and that which appears to the subject as the unknowable) something radical takes place that opens a path for Hegel’s later reading of “imagination qua the ‘activity of dissolution” and ultimately gives zizek grounds to stake out an invasion/inversion of the subject.

Drawing from an amazing passage in Hegel’s phenomenology on this dissolution: “To break an idea up into its original elements is to return to its moments, which at least do not have the form of the given idea, but rather constitute the immediate property of the self.  …The activity of dissolution is the power and work of the undestanding, the most astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the absolute power. …But that an accident as such, detached from what circumscribes it, what is bound and is actual only in its contects with others, should attain an existence of its own and a separate freedom – this is the tremendous power of the negative, it is the energy of thought, of the pure ‘I'” (p.30).

the power of imagination, as cited in this passage from hegel is the power to tear apart.  It is not, then, reason which dissects and does violence to thought, but imagination which is a more originary violence, and always already ‘dismembering’ of thought.  zizek reiterates this in an investigation of kant’s work on the sublime, again inverting the traditional reading of the sublime as violent to thought, to reason, instead to the sublime which is the ‘real’ of imagination, barely veiled by reason as what it already is.  

“Our (Hegelian) point, however, is that this mythical/impossible starting point, the presupposition of imagination, is already the product, the result, of the imagination’s disruptive activity.  In short, the mythic, inaccessible zero-level of pure multitude not yet affected/fashioned by imagination is nothing but pure imagination itself, imagination at its most violent, as the activity of disrupting the continuity of the inertia of the pre-symbolic ‘natural’ Real” (p.33).

Ok, so then moving quickly as this recap is surely dragging…

‘The Passage through Madness’.  zizek resituates normality as a paranoiac psychosis (via lacan) and doesn’t stop before citing sexual difference (again via lacan) in kant’s work on the sublime.

where he goes next will have to wait until i’ve had some sleep…

habit forming.

In Subjection on November 8, 2008 at 8:15 pm

what do parsifal, bertrand russell and Nip/Tuck have in common?

slavoj zizek.  or rather he has them in common.  or was i correct the first time..?

yes, in fact, parsifal, bertrand russell and Nip/Tuck have slavoj zizek in common, if we hold to his line of thinking in “tolerance as an ideological category” critical inquiry, vol 34, #4.  in brief, it goes like this… 

from wendy brown’s latest book – Regulating Aversion:Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire zizek both praises and critiques her assessment of liberalism and choice, ultimately coming down on the side of critique.  as brown finds the particularity in universalizing claims since descartes, pointing out that liberal tolerance is only tolerant of tolerance.  On questions such as veiling women, clitorisectomies, ‘sati’ or widow burning, liberals will and do consider themselves justified in not tolerating (even violently acting against) perceived intolerance. taking up an uncommon defense of liberalism against brown’s analysis, zizek points out that what remains unthought and/or flawed in her work is the following: 

“First, she ignores the tremendously liberating aspect of experiencing one’s own cultural background as contingent.  There is an authentic core to political liberalism.  Let us not forget that liberalism emerged in Europe after the catastrophe of the Thirty Years War between Catholics and Protestants; it was an answer to the pressing quesiton, How could people who differ in their fundamental religious allegiances coexist? …It is only within this ideological space that one can experience one’s identity as something contingent and discursively constructed; to cut a long story short, philosophically, there is no Judith Butler (with her theory  of gender identity as performatively enacted) without the Cartesian subject.” (p. 666)  

Easy enough, zizek easily sights the ways in which Brown’s own position would be impossible without the very emergence of cultural contingency she is critiquing.  Yet why would zizek, leftist extraordinaire, defend liberalism? (Not) knowing better, one might think zizek was simply playing the devil’s advocate.  Yet in fact, he has something more of an angel in mind.  And:

“This brings us to Brown’s next limitation.  Her critique of liberalism remains at the standard Marxist level of denouncing false universality, of showing how a position that presents itself as neutral or universal effectively privileges a certain (heterosexual, male, Christian) culture.  More precisely, she remains within the standard postmodern, antiessentialist position… “Man,” the bearer of human rights, is generated by a set of political practices that materialize citizenship; human rights are such a false ideological universality that masks and legitimizes a concrete politics of Western imperialism, and domination, legitimizing military interventions and neocolonialism.  Is this analysis enough?” (p. 668)

In the context zizek himself lays out in catching wendy in the game she is critiquing, isn’t zizek’s ending question to the quote above something of the same fault?

Yet beside and to that point, of course this analysis is not enough.  It is not enough to say that formal freedom is merely formal.  Jacques Ranciere and Claude Lefort, even Stalin, and, well… women voters, have shown otherwise.  And were it enough, there would be no need for the post-marxists.  And were it enough, there would be no need for badiou. 

and here is where we have been going all along.  in a gesture of praise and solidarity, zizek writes:

“The key moment of any theoretical (and ethical, and political, and – as Badious demonstrated – even aesthetic) struggle is the rise of universality out of the particular lifeworld… the authentic moment of discovery, the breakthrough, occurs when a properly universal dimension explodes form within a particular context and becomes for-itself, directly experienced as such (as universal).  This universality-for-itself is not simply external to (or above) the particular context.  It is inscribed into it, it perturbs and affects it from within, so that the identity of the particular is split into its particular universal aspect.” (p. 670)

In an almost perfect inversion of post-structuralism, paired with an uncanny condensation of badiou’s ontological project, zizek here unmasks where a large strain of philosophy, since derrida, since marx, since foucault, has gone and is going.  from the unearthing of particularity in universality toward a de-essentializing, the likes of which Wendy Brown and Judith Butler are practicing, to a search for universality in the particular sounds like a terrifying fall back.  anticipating this, zizek offers a re-vision of universality, consistent with badiou’s: “Actual universality is not the deep feeling that, above all differences, different civilizations share the same basic values; actual universality appears (actualizes itself) as the experience of negativity, of the inadequacy-to-itself of a particular identity.”

when questioned at his Cardozo lectures last week as to a definition or a ground for his own use of and push toward universality, badiou answered much like zizek did in the quote above, saying essentially, he did not know what universality or equality would look like but he knew where it was not. in the problems surrounding the french workers sans papiers the in-equality, or non-universality of the french state is evident to badiou.  zizek would explain these workers as figures ‘marked by a profound split’, or ‘thwarted in [their] endeavor to reach their identity’.  either way, for both thinkers, oddly the absence of equality marks the possibility for universality, signifying that we are oddly back to the socratic dialogues wherein not-knowing is one’s most secure form of knowledge.  badiou, a vocal platonist, would affirm this link (or should i say, would not disavow it?) yet…

the temptation is now, of course, to ask:  if this (negative) analysis enough?

but perhaps the problem is not one of inadequacy, falling short, or not being enough… perhaps the question to be asked is: isn’t this already too much?  

for in fact, despite a negative definition of universalism, it isn’t a minimalism or scarcity in badiou and zizek’s claims that raises problems.  it isn’t this movement i’m tracing of the ‘it is not’… it is ‘what is’ that raises red flags, and it is ‘what could be’ that really becomes frightening.  universality, even by badiou’s definition, is a concept in full strength and universality has the timber of destruction in its voicing.  to this end, zizek cites ‘revolutionary-egalitarian figures from Robespierre to John Brown’ as figures without habits, those who refused to play by the rules of social ‘potlatch’.  and here i get stuck.  as zizek performs and enacts his own beef with brown over the ability of liberals to raise their own guns of intolerance against the intolerant, he consistently moves toward a subjectivity that comes at the point of that same gun*.  while badiou will broaden violence to include things like ‘worker’s strikes’ and not simply bloodshed per se, he and zizek seem strained to find suitably non-violent alternatives.

it is these ‘what is’ and ‘what could be’ options that do, in fact, push us (philosophers? thinkers? subjects? liberals?) past the point of potlatch.  with only a negative definition of universality and equality, i cannot simply nod and say thank you.  yet, would positivism be any less frightening?  is this analysis too much?  is it already enough?

and yet this is precisely what zizek goes on to propose: in our acceptance of the potlatch, i take up habits and, according to zizek, identities, which are ‘in their very transparency, …the medium of social violence’.  violence is not something i can choose to take part in or to reject either for or against universality.  as we began, with zizek resulting as the commonality of parsifal, russell and Nip/Tuck, the subject is, for zizek, a result of habits, of culture.  Using Lacan’s distinction between the subject of the enunciated and the subject of enunciating (could we swap this out for Heidegger’s ‘said’ and ‘saying’ respectively?) we have zizek’s point. Wherein the first, the subject of the enunciated, a subject moves to change the world while holding her position, in the second, the subject of the enunciation the subject moves to change the world and herself with it.  In both cases, violence is occuring: in the enunciated the subject is passive and subjected to a violence from without.  in the enunciating, the subject is actively and violently applying violence to itself.  what zizek is doing with these examples is laying out the impossibility of non-violence.  he is offering the positive choice of self-infliction (the only ‘real’ choice contemporary liberalism has to offer) rather than passive reception.  he is offering John Brown.  he is offering Robespierre.  he is, in fact, offering the messiah.

just don’t let the name Badiou fool you… 


*when, in Saas-Fee in August of 2008 I pointed out, in conversation with him, that his description of the subject as the object which objects sounded in very close harmony with Butler’s performative subject, he replied, in concert with his argument in question, that yes, it might be close, but for him subject formation has to hurt.

what women want.

In Friendship on November 7, 2008 at 9:48 pm

i realized today, just a minute ago, in fact, that i have been waiting for derrida to speak to me.  to speak of me.  to tell me what women want.from friendship.

i have followed him through 266 pages this week. moving through schmitt, aristotle, montaigne and finally heidegger, questioning the boys club they’ve created, pushing on the pacts, the penchants, the particularities of fraternity and friendship.  admirable, yes.  yet, my most obvious idiocy, (looking to the man Jacques Derrida to tell me about women’s friendship,) is and is not what interests me most.  what i’m interested in here, and now, is what this blight may or may not say about the sexual difference Derrida hints to and around throughout The Politics of Friendship.  Here, for example, you can see where my steps locked pace with his:

“Let us return to Schmitt, and expand our perspective.  That which a macroscopic view is able to align, from afar and form high above, is a certain desert.  Not a woman in sight.  An inhabited desert, to be sure, an absolutely full absolute desert, some might even say a desert teeming with people.  Yes, but men, men and more men, over centuries of war, and costumes, hats, uniforms, soutanes, warriors, colonels, generals, partisans, strategists, politicians, professors, political theoreticians, theologians.  In vain would you look for a figure of a woman, a feminine silhouette, and the slightest allusion to sexual difference… At any rate, this seems to be the case in the texts that deal with  the political, with the political as such (The Concept of the Political and the Theory of the Partisan).”  Derrida, Jacques.  The Politics of Friendship, p. 156

And yet at “…the slightest allusion to sexual difference…” I jumped ship.  Or perhaps he found another partner. One can’t help hearing Luce Irigaray’s thought in Derrida’s words… even and/or particularly if not her very own name.

Who does Derrida name outside of his brothers? Just following the above ‘deserted’ quote Derrida mentions one of the only women to appear in his text: a nun. And, a nun who was, in fact, addressed by Saint Francis of Assisi as “Dear Brother Jacqueline”.  Now his point is well taken.  Which he of the ‘his’?  Both.  Dear Saint Francis of Assisi.  We could say he lived so long ago that he may not have known better.  Or we could say, with Derrida, that perhaps fraternity has a silent sisterhood somewhere within.  But what we won’t say with Derrida is a history of friendship sans the history of women while pointing out the absence of women.

So, let’s just get all of that out of the way upfront.  Women write on friendship and here is the proof:

Hannah Arendt, in the Human Condition, carefully details degrees of difference between loves and friendships.

Helene Cixous has written on friendship, politics and women in each arena.

Just two names to start.  Can I quit here in good conscience?  Can I, in such an unfriendly gesture, omit the scores of other women whose names should be here?  Or would it be more in line with friendship to let this list fall silent.  It seems trivializing, incidental.  Or, more accurately, instrumental.

The question is not who is writing.  Women are writing.  Women Are writing.

But the question heres is something other, something like: Where do we want to go, where are we (women) going that is not lead by Derrida, nor Nancy, Blanchot and Bataille (his friends) and neither Aristotle, Cicero, Montaigne or Schmitt?  Isn’t this the question?

Or have I now entered the terrain of enemies?  Clearly, in the Politics of Friendship, Derrida is addressing Carl Schmitt.  Taking his work to task, to trial in fact, and seeking out the other enemy that Schmitt himself refuses: that of the dissolution of politics, of the friend/enemy distinction, of the ability of men to kill with assurance.  Or is clarity so much of the problem here?  Derrida is not, in fact addressing Carl Schmitt the man.  He addresses Schmitt only incidentally, quite as a public enemy: someone to be respected even when knifed (especially when knifed) from behind.  Does Derrida not, in fact fall right through the lines he writes against Schmitt?  And was he perhaps aware of this danger all along?

“Without an enemy, I go mad, I can no longer think, I become powerless to think myself, to pronounce ‘cogito, ergo sum’.  For that I must have an evil genius, a spiritus malignus, a deceitful spirit.  Did not Schmitt allude to this in his cell?  Without this absolute hostility, the ‘I’ loses reason, and the possibility of being posed, of posing or of opposing the object in front of it; ‘I’ loses objectivity, reference, the ultimate stability of that which resists… Philosophy is at stake here, and this is what the cry of the living fool gives up to be heard.”   Derrida, Jacques.  The Politics of Friendship, p. 176.

With philosophy at stake, Derrida is knowingly among the accused.  But weren’t the best heretics also always women?  And now to the difference I’ve danced ’round long enough.

When I lent my ear to Derrida, I was listening for something, a word: desire.  What do women want?  What do they want of friendship, what do they make of friendship, what do they when they ‘they’?  

I cannot answer these questions.  I, a woman, do not know what ‘women’ want because I have yet to know, meet or read ‘women’.  Perhaps Derrida hasn’t either.  Perhaps that is why ‘women’ stay silent, despite the insistent references to sexual difference.  Perhaps.

lions and tigers and bears…’O my’

In Friendship, resurrection, Subjection on November 3, 2008 at 12:06 am

If ‘love wants to possess…’

friendship is …perhaps…

but perhaps what?

not the planning of funeral attendents

yet certainly for Derrida (and his posse, his brotherhood…) deadly.

but where are we?  from aristotle to montaigne to Derrida, passed from lip to ear (with a bit of  ‘O my friends, there is no friend.’ works across the terrains of time: 

-touching the ‘to come’ of and to futurity in Nietzsche 

-creeping from behind, through the past in Cicero (friendship with and of the same), through the greeks (to be loved or to love?) and of course via Aristotle 

-and of the impossible present both in Heidegger and in Mauss – (present as gift)  

And what happens when Nietzsche inverts the phrase in question:  ‘O foes, there is no foe!’ In this a mad tongue wags – but why? While Aristotle & Montaigne propose an enmity at the heart of friendship, Nietzsche in fact points to a friendship to come… X that is not X, enemies that are not enemies… “Perhaps! (Vielleicht!)”

“It is perhaps impossible, as a matter of fact.  Perhaps the impossible is the only possible chance of something new.  Perhaps; perhaps, in truth, the perhaps still names this chance.  Perhaps friendship, if there is such a thing, must honour [faire droit] what appears impossible here.”  (PF, Derrida, p.36)

this impossibility, the impossibility of friends to come, of friendship, of perhaps I… we… Derrida locates in a very intimate they (“This is perhaps ‘the community of those without community (15)”.  (PF, Derrida, p. 37)) Is it out of love or of friendship that Derrida cites Blanchot citing Bataille?  or perhaps it is a proper introduction of the ‘we’… the we whose only commonality is singularity, solitude. (see PF, Derrida, p.46)

Within these friends to come, these friends of solitude, the words is – silence.  “Friendship does not keep silence, it is preserved by silence” (PF, Derrida, p. 52)  What does this say of the compulsion to divulge, to know, to tell all – it speaks love, not friendship, possession not spacing, when what is needed is “… knowledge of how to evacuate words to gain breathing space for friendship” (PF, Derrida, p.53)

from punctuation to the punctured: on christian virtue, of christian virtue… perhaps the injunction to love your enemies is less benign than it first appears.  to love to posess those that persecute you: here we arrive at karl schmitt’s dearest (direst?) hope.  yet the decision, the political decision par excellence, is, it seems already made.  it arrives passively, passionately, but without an I in possession.  Precisely the I is what is subsumed by subject making (though foucault and butler might find space for both?) in Derrida’s formulations.  Beating like a heart, without subjective orders (much like deleuze on nietzsche – the body, the bits the affirmations that take place pre-consciously)… the subject is decided already and before.  The friends is the enemy is now the friend… and who is to say it could be otherwise?  who?


In Subjection on November 2, 2008 at 12:19 am

once again.  jean-luc nancy

and philippe lacoue-labarthe

the title of the letter: a reading of lacan

tracing in the old-school sense, the sort that really needed tracing paper and a perfectly dulled pencil or a steady pen.  is it the text that traces, or the authors? isn’t the issue insistently at hand that regardless of which who traces, there is no underlayer, no subtext to be traced… or perhaps there is a subtext, a figure, a man’s discourse even, but it isn’t lacan himself.  there can be no corresondence.  between the tracing pencil and the (what? what lies beneath there is something instead that acts as carbon paper. an inversion, (diversion is the opperative) and the trace becomes the line to follow, the line that marks, just and only that which is the re-mark.

so much between these sheets.

Nancy & Lacoue-Labarthe, running their fingers over Lacan, (like braille?) but not the whole of him.  just the hole of him in fact…

Following Lacan’s work in “The Agency of the Letter”, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe perform a close reading of that article in the first chapters of The Title of the Letter.  One movement of the text writes as follows:

In order to ground psychoanalysis as something other than one of the many sciences, and against depth psychology (theories of the unconscious prevailing) Jacques Lacan entered university discourse, philosophical discourse, by re-positioning psychoanalysis somewhere in the halls between classrooms, rather than solely in the halls of the hospital or clinic.  But somewhere is too vague: directly outside the door of linguistics, and right around the corner from anthropology would be more precise. So just inside the faculty mailboxes of Saussure and Strauss, Lacan did a bit of sorting.  Between inter-campus mailings and university paystubs, Lacan ends up –  upturning Saussure’s algorithm of signification.  Coming out on top, Lacan’s S over s (Signifier over the signified) is the well known inversion.  For Lacan, the fractional (fractured…) algorithm that I can’t produce on this keyboard illustrated the Signifiers inability to cross the fractional line, its barring in fact, from and to the signified loosened the strings and cut the ties for any subject from the Cartesian ego.


to be continued…