i am enthralled by a conversation taking place over the last 24 hours on Levi Bryant’s blog, Larval Subjects. while Levi elegantly outlines his object oriented philosophy in response to a bit of an academic debate, what emerges is the following seductive position on post-humanism, post-language:
Everything said of the signifier is right, but it must also be said of every other kind of object. From the standpoint of Onticology, we can vary this thesis in a variety of ways, all of which are endorsed by Onticology:
* Everything Kant says of the nature of minds, concepts, and intuitions as they relate to the world is right, but it must also be said of every relation among objects.
* Everything Heidegger says of the relationship between Dasein and objects is right, but it must also be said of every other relation among objects.
* Everything Husserl says of intentionality is right, but it must also be said of every other relation among objects.
* Everything Foucault says of power and epistemes is right, but it must also be said of every other relation among objects.
And so on.
what I would like to add to this list (which was never really excluded, just not yet added…) is this:
* Everything Derrida says about differance and iterability is right, but must also be said of every other relation among objects.
at first read, this addition may seem unnecessary, as Derrida was never working with the subject, with the human, but always up and through these notions and toward their impossibility. yet, it is precisely on the point of iterability that Derrida’s work can enter into conversation with object oriented philosophy. difference in deleuze, the miraculous relation that is repetition, is so closely atuned to the work Derrida was doing with differance as to be mistaken as the also (and thankfully) impossible same.
working with saussure’s split between the signified and signifier derrida’s work exemplifies the always differential deferral of meaning in signification. to dangerously oversimplify, for derrida there is no essence, no origin, only links and chains of signifiers. in the vocabulary of iterability, as written in his debate with john searle, as context is never constant, never given and never fully comprehensible (always exceeding definition, explanation and ‘meaning’) meaning is only ever deferred. this leads to his work on writing as necessitating death, etc… and while this is all quite fascinating, the point i want to emphasize here is that between derrida and deleuze, between derrida and object oriented philosophy, there is a shared recognition that being is difference: and this applies in/as being for ‘man’ (though this is a tenuous term for both derrida and deleuze) as well as being for objects…
i need to do more work here, but appreciate levi’s post today in reaching into this project and digging out points i need to further question.